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Abstract
How much does one need to know about the characteristics of hete-
rogeneous agents in order to position them correctly in an organi-
zational structure? This question is addressed in a project selection
framework with error{prone decision{makers.
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1 Introduction
It is hard to understand what the relevance is of uncertainty, diversity,
and complexity for organizational design, communication, and decision{
making if not the resulting diculty in making correct choices and the
accompanying likelihood of erroneous decisions.
1
Indeed, Herbert Simon
has made a point of stressing that it are the limited cognitive capabilities
of individual human beings that requires organizational decision{making
to be multi{person decision{making. However, words like \errors", \er-
roneous decisions", \fallible decision{makers" and the like, are virtually
absent from the literature on organizational design and communication.
This may be the result of the predominantly mechanistic characterization
of organizational communication as information processing which tends
to focus on channels of communication and messages sent.
2
The presence
of a full rationality assumption forms another obstacle to a discussion of
faulty decision{making.
3
Moreover, many authors tend to use abstract
phrases like organizational agents that are \aected by" or \prompted
by" their environment and its characteristics, or information about threats
and opportunities in the environment that \initiates" or \inuences" or-
ganizational actions, by which the authors perhaps implicitly refer to the
possibility of error{prone decision{makers. In any event, faulty decision{
1
There is a large literature dealing with the eect of uncertainty, diversity, and com-
plexity on organizational design in general and on decision{making and organizational
communication in particular. See Galbraith (1973), March and Simon (1993), Thomp-
son (1968), and many of the contributions in Jablin et al. (1987) and in Hirokawa
and Poole (1986). Contributions to the principal{agent literature and the literature on
pricing behaviour may serve as other examples.
2
Some recent contributions to the economics literature on organizational design that
equate communication to information processing are Radner (1993), and Bolton and
Dewatripont (1994).
3
See the discussion of the various perspectives on organizational communication in
Krone et al. (1987), and in Euske and Roberts (1987). In the principal{agent literature,
the optimality of the contract, and hence the absence of errors, is guaranteed by the
rationality of the contract designer.
1
making receives explicit attention from only two small, complementary
sets of papers.
Concerning the causes of systematically erroneous decisions, Donald
Campbell provides various explanations based on certain human traits.
With action preferred to paralysis (especially when a decision should even-
tually be taken), and in the presence of an associative memory, human
beings show a tendency to ll gaps in messages and information that re-
ach them, and to assimilate current information to past information on
the basis of particular clues and similarities.
4
Miller provides an indeed
dramatic example showing how a long distance between the original source
of a message and the eventual user of the message may radically distort
the content of the message:
\A reporter was present at a hamlet burned down by the U. S.
Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division in 1967. Investigation showed
that the order from the division headquarters to the brigade
was: \On no occasion must hamlets be burned down." The
brigade radioed the battalion: \Do not burn down any hamlets
unless you are absolutely convinced that the Viet Cong are
in them." The battalion radioed the infantry company at the
scene: \If you think there are any Viet Cong in the hamlet,
burn it down." The company commander ordered his troops:
\Burn down that hamlet."
5
Although I am not sure what the reason was behind the replacement of
the unconditional order \On no occasion must hamlets be burned down"
by the conditional command \Do not burn down any hamlets unless you
are absolutely convinced that the Viet Cong are in them," it seems hard
to interpret as a random error. Indeed, it might be that on previous
occasions the order send by division headquarters had had this conditional
4
See Campbell (1959), pp. 341{351.
5
Miller quoted in Huber and Daft (1987), p. 150.
2
structure. The current message may have been interpreted by association
as a conditional command.
Campbell also notes that if a group of persons has to decide on an
issue the variation in their opinion is likely to diminish as a result of com-
munication between the members of the group. He is not specic, however,
about the precise way group communication aects the variety of opini-
ons.
6
At the time Campbell wrote, communication theory was still in its
infancy, but even contemporary accounts of group communication theory
pay scant attention to the interaction between communication structure
and resulting errors. Randy Hirokawa and Dirk Scheerhorn (1986) do
not go beyond the claim that \the social inuence exerted on the group
by individual members will eectively facilitate or prevent the occurrence
of (. . . ) potential sources of faulty group decision{making" (p. 76). In
Gouran and Hirokawa (1986) various ways to counter erroneous inferences
and decisions are listed, but the role of communication structure is not
mentioned.
Indeed, the only thorough discussion of the way structure and er-
rors interact that I am aware can be found in a series of papers by Raj
Sah and Joseph Stiglitz, and by Shmuel Nitzan, Jacob Paroush et al. In
either case, agents must decide whether to accept or to reject a project.
An error arises when a good project is rejected or when a bad project is
accepted. Sah and Stiglitz characterise an agent by a pair of probabilities
capturing the likelihood with which these errors arise. They compare sim-
ple organizational architectures that dier with respect to the sequential
structure of the project screening process in terms of the expected value of
the projects that are eventually implemented. Nitzan, Paroush et al., on
the other hand, characterise an agent by the overall probability of faulty
decisions, and ignore sequential decision structures.
7
6
Campbell (1959), pp. 360{362
7
Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988). Papers by Hendrikse (1992), Ioannides (1987),
and Koh (1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b) extend results obtained by Sah and Stig-
litz. For the other approach see, e.g., Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and Karotkin, Nitzan
3
In this paper I use Sah and Stiglitz' framework, and address the
following two questions. Suppose that some agents are more error{prone
than others, what then should be their optimal ordering within a given
organizational structure? Who should be the rst to evaluate a project,
who should be next? Does the positioning of agents matter at all? This
leads to the second question. How much does one need to know about
the screening qualities of the individual agents to allocate them correctly?
Suppose the ordering of agents matters. Does the ordering depend on the
relative quality (who is the better agent?) or does it depend on the exact
qualities of the agents under examination?
In theory, then, one can distinguish organizational structures on the
basis of the detail in information necessary to nd the optimal allocation
of heterogeneous agents to positions within these structures. This pa-
per classies organizational structures on the basis of such informational
requirements.
The interest in such a classication stems from a few observations.
First of all, if more detail cannot be obtained, or it can be acquired but
only in a distorted form and at a cost, organizations that require less
detailed information for the determination of the optimal positioning of
agents have a clear advantage over structures requiring more detailed in-
formation, ceteris paribus
8
.
Secondly, with any increase in detail necessary to optimally position
heterogeneous agents, errors becomes more likely. Although an organiza-
tional form requiring information that is more detailed than some other
structure may perform better if the employees have been positioned cor-
rectly, its performance may be highly sensitive to errors in the positioning
of agents. Indeed, these errors may cause the former to perform worse
than the latter. Probably, the less detail required, the more robust a
decision structure is to such errors.
and Paroush (1988).
8
Ceteris paribus, since the organization that requires more detailed information may
perform better than the other when the information needed is actually available.
4
Thirdly, this paper suggests a novel way to think about the comple-
xity of an organization. The notion of complexity gures prominently in
the literature on the design of organizational structures. A structure is
called complex if it contains many interdependent parts whose individual
functioning is of importance to the overall performance of the organiza-
tion. The more complex an organization the heavier the demands on its
information processing capacities.
9
The analysis in the sections that fol-
low contributes to the literature on organizational design by discussing the
complexity of an organization in terms of the level of detail in information
required to optimally structure error{prone agents.
Turning to the results, I show which organizational structures re-
quire no information at all about the screening capabilities of the agents.
These structures are all characterized by the fact that every agent only
evaluates a project if the preceding agents have all accepted the project or
all preceding agents have rejected the project. The second class of struc-
tures are those that require only ordinal knowledge about the qualities
of the agents. This class of structures is characterized by the fact that
every agent's decision can be nal. In other words, there is not an agent
whose evaluation will always be followed by some other agent's evaluation,
irrespective of the former agent's decision to accept or reject. Indeed, the
mere presence of one agent whose decision will always be followed by some
other agent's evaluation is enough to make ordinal information insucient
to nd the optimal ordering of agents.
Section 2 describes the model in detail. Section 3 states the main
propositions. Section 4 concludes. The proofs of the lemma's can be found
in the appendix.
9
See Galbraith (1973), Huber and Daft (1987), Jablin (1987), and Scott (1981)
among many others.
5
2 The Model
In this section I rigorously characterize the main elements of the mo-
del: the project environment, the agents, dierent degrees of neness of
information about the screening capabilities of the agents, and the orga-
nizations.
2.1 The Project Environment
There exists a pool of projects of size 1. Projects can be either of good
quality, q = g (which is the case with probability ), or of bad quality,
q = b (which is the case with probability 1   ). An implemented, good
project gives rise to a prot X
1
, while an implemented, bad project leads
to a loss equal to  X
2
.
2.2 The Agents
An agent i 2 I = f1; : : : ; ng can either accept, A, or reject, R, a project.
That is, the action set D
i
equals D
i
= fA;Rg for every i 2 I . Agent i is
characterized by a pair of probabilities (p
g
i
; p
b
i
). The rst element stands
for the probability with which agent i accepts a good quality project, while
the second represents the probability with which he accepts bad projects.
This pair of probabilities captures the screening capabilities of i. I assume
that an agent is fallible: some bad projects are accepted, while some good
ones are rejected. Moreover, I assume that an agent is \better" than a
randomizing device using a fair coin. Having projects selected by the toss
of a coin means that half of the good and half of the bad projects are
accepted. An agent does better, in that he accepts more than one out of
two good projects, and rejects more than half of the time a bad project.
10
10
Dening \agent i is better than a randomizing device using a fair coin" in terms of
the sign of the dierence in prots generated by the addition of i or the device to some
6
Denition 1 Agent i will be called better than a randomizing device using
a fair coin if and only if p
b
i
< 1=2 < p
g
i
.
Similarly, agent i will be called better than agent j if the former accepts
more good projects than the latter, and rejects more bad projects than
the latter.
Denition 2 For any two agents i and j, agent i is called better than
agent j if and only if p
g
i
> p
g
j
and p
b
i
< p
b
j
. That i is better than j will be
denoted by i  j.
Assuming that every agent is better than a fair coin, but still fallible then
amounts to:
Assumption 1 For every agent i 2 I, 0 < p
b
i
< 1=2 < p
g
i
< 1.
The set I will only contain agents whose screening characteristics are
ordered in the following way.
Assumption 2 For every i; j 2 I either i  j or j  i.
The possibility of identical agents is therefore excluded. This only strengt-
hens the results I derive below. Although the agents are ordered in this
sense, this does not mean that this ordering is known. In this chapter, I
distinguish three types of information concerning the screening capabili-
ties of the agents: no information at all, ordinal information, and cardinal
information. The distinction is based on the degree of neness of infor-
mation.
existing organization A is, in general, decient as it makes the ordinal statement of i
being better or not than the device dependent on cardinal knowledge of the probabilities
characterizing the agents working in A. The only case in which such cardinal knowledge
is not required is when agent i is better or not than the device according to denition 1.
The same holds, mutatis mutandis for the denition of agent i being better than agent
j.
7
Denition 3 If there is no information about the screening capabilities
of any agent i 2 I, one does not know the pair (p
g
i
; p
b
i
) of any agent, nor
can one order the agents using denition 2. Indeed, one only knows that
agents are fallible, and that they are better than a fair coin.
The other extreme in terms of richness of information about the agents is
cardinal information:
Denition 4 There is cardinal information about the screening capabili-
ties of all the agents i 2 I if for every i the pair (p
g
i
; p
b
i
) is known.
In between no information at all and cardinal information about all the
agents there is the situation of ordinal information.
11
Ordinal information
means information about the ordering of agents in terms of their screening
qualities.
Denition 5 There is ordinal information about the screening capabilities
of the agents i 2 I if only the ordering based on assumption 2 is known,
and agents are known to be fallible and to be better than a randomizing
device using a fair coin.
2.3 The organizations
An organization is characterized by its structure and by the distribution
of agents over the organizational positions.
Denition 6 An organizational structure  is a nite binary arbore-
scence, i.e., an organizational structure is a nite, directed, rooted tree,
in which at every node  two edges start.
12
8

a

aa

ar

aar
A
R
A
R
A
R
A
R
A
R
Figure 1: An organizational structure 
An example is the structure shown in gure 1. The nodes stand for
organizational departments, bureaus, or desks, and the directed edges
represent the direction of ow of evaluated projects. The labels on the
edges starting at a node are associated with the actions taken at that
node. Since an organizational structure is a binary arborescence, every
node  can be reached by just one, nite, ordered series of Accept and/or
Reject decisions. Every node will be indexed by this series of decisions.
For example, a node that is reached after an acceptance and a successive
rejection, will be denoted by 
ar
. The root is denoted by . That part of
the structure that starts with the node 
aa
is itself a structure, and will be
called a sub{structure. It will be indexed by the unique series of decisions
through which it can be reached. Hence, the sub{structure starting after
rst an acceptance and then a rejection is denoted by 
AR
.
11
I am not claiming that this is the only type of information between both extremes.
Indeed, the analysis in the next section suggests that a few other degrees of neness
could be usefully introduced.
12
The organization is a tree, since no project reaches one and the same desk twice.
It is a rooted tree, since one and the same bureau is the rst to evaluate every project.
The tree is directed because projects ow just in one direction between two successive
bureaus. The tree is binary, since at every organizational position a project can either
accepted or rejected. Finally, the tree is nite since the number of nodes the structure
contains is nite. For a discussion of graph terminology and concepts see, for example,
L. R. Foulds (1992).
9
It will be useful to let j, l, and k stand for a nite series of A's and
R's (or of a's and r's).
13
The symbol 
j
may even stand for the root ,
and analogously 
j
may denote the whole structure .
For every pair of nodes (
j
; 
l
) let !(
j
; 
l
) denote the rst common
predecessor of 
j
and 
l
. Graphically, this is the rst node that is on both
the path back from 
j
to the root , and on the path back from 
l
to the
root. The sub{structure (
j
; 
l
) is important in the determination of the
dierence in prot ensuing from swapping nodes 
j
and 
l
.
Denition 7 Let (
j
; 
l
) be dened as the sub{structure that starts with
node !(
j
; 
l
).
(
j
; 
l
) is, in some sense, the smallest sub{structure that contains both

j
and 
l
.
Example In gure 1, !(
ar
; 
aa
) = 
a
, while the sub{structure (
ar
; 
aa
)
equals 
A
.
Figure 2 shows the three dierent ways in which a node can be connected
to its successive sub{structure(s). There are three basic building blocks
that allow one to build any organizational structure. The rst is a node

j
, an edge labeled A, and a sub{structure 
jA
. This building block is
called a hierarchical connection, and will be represented by 
j
H
jA
; the
second is a node 
j
, an edge labeled R, and a sub{structure 
jR
. Such a
building block is called a polyarchical connection, and will be represented
by 
j
P
jR
; and thirdly a node 
j
, an edge labeled A, a sub{structure

jA
, an edge R, and a sub{structure 
jR
. This building block is coined
an omniarchical connection, and will be denoted byO(
j
;
jA
;
jR
). Since
any sub{structure can be considered a structure itself, any organizational
structure can be recursively constructed using these three building blocks.
This can be done in either of two ways. Either one adds nodes at the ends
13
Capitals will be used for (possible degenerate) sub{organizations, and small letters
for single nodes.
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
A
A
R
A
R
Hierarchical
Connection


R
A
R
A
R
Polyarchical
Connection


A
A A
R

R
R
A
R
Omniarchial
Connection
Figure 2: The three building blocks
of the arrows of nodes that are part of existing structures, or one adds
nodes \in front of" existing structures, by having the arrows of the new
nodes connecting to the existing structure(s). The latter way of forming
structures is used in the proofs of the propositions in this chapter.
To make clear that a structure takes on a particular form, the sym-
bol \
S
=" is used. Hence, 
S
= P
A
becomes a meaningful expression.
Example (continued) The structure in gure 1 is uniquely described by
the expression 
S
= HO(
a
; 
aa
P
aar
; 
ar
).
A structure that contains only hierarchical (polyarchical) connections is
called a pure hierarchy (polyarchy). A pure structure refers to either of
these. A linear structure may contain both hierarchical and polyarchical
connections, but does certainly not have omniarchical connections. A li-
near structure consisting of both hierarchical and polyarchical connections
is called a mixed linear structure. The linearity refers to the fact that the
graphical representation of such a structure can be linear, with all nodes
on one line, and with the label on the horizontal connection between any
two nodes either R or A.
11
Associated with every structure  is a probability function p(; q),
which gives the probability with which a project of quality q will be ac-
cepted. Often, the notation p(), without special reference to the precise
quality q, will be used instead of p(; q). Obviously, the precise proba-
bility depends on the identity of the agents located at the various nodes.
Let p(
j
) stand for the probability that a project will be accepted at node

j
, and p(
j
) for the probability that sub{structure 
j
accepts a project.
Exploiting the fact that  can be recursively constructed, one can dene
p() using the following recursive denition.
p(
j
) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
p(
j
)p(
jA
) if 
j
S
= 
j
H
jA
p(
j
) + (1   p(
j
))p(
jR
) if 
j
S
= 
j
P
jR
p(
j
)p(
jA
) + (1  p(
j
))p(
jR
) if 
j
S
= O(
j
;
jA
;
jR
)
(1)
Example (continued) Consider the example, depicted in gure 1, of

S
= HO(
a
; 
aa
P
aar
; 
ar
) . Its probability function equals
p() = p() [p(
a
) (p(
aa
) + (1  p(
aa
))p(
aar
)) + (1   p(
r
))p(
ar
)]
(2)
Within a given structure, the heterogeneous agents have to be allocated
to nodes in such a way as to maximize the expected prot.
Denition 8 An allocation  : I !  is a mapping from the set of agents
I to the set of organizational positions .
14
An organization species both a structure and an allocation of agents to
organizational positions.
Denition 9 The pair (; ) is called an organization.
14
Note that the allocation is a mapping from agents to nodes, not from nodes to
agents. This implies no limitation in the framework studied here as I exclude the
possibility of identical agents. Note moreover that one needs to increase the number
of agents with the number of organizational positions.
12
The probability that an organization (; ) accepts a project of
quality q is denoted by p(; ; q). It can be calculated by substituting
into the probability function p(; q) the values of p
q
i
in the organizational
positions according to the allocation . Take the example of structure

S
= O(; 
a
P
ar
H
ara
; 
r
), and suppose that the allocation of agents
(1; 2; 3; 4; 5) equals (1) = (), (2) = (
a
), (3) = (
aa
), (4) = (
ar
),
and (5) = (
aar
). The probability that organization (; ) accepts a
project of good quality then becomes
p(; ; g) = p
g
1
[p
g
2
(p
g
3
+ (1   p
g
3
)p
g
5
) + (1  p
g
2
)p
g
4
] (3)
The expected prot of organization (; ) equals
E(;; ) = X
1
p(; ; g)   (1  )X
2
p(; ; b) (4)
Let 


(I) be the set of allocations 


(I) that maximizes expression (4) for
a given structure  (and for a given set I). The question the propositions
in the next section answer is twofold. First of all, which structures  allow
the elements of 


(I) to be determined using no information about the
characteristics of the agents at all? And secondly, which structures  make
ordinal information about these characteristics necessary and sucient to
nd the optimal allocation.
In proving these propositions the following notation is useful. If, for
a given structure , the allocation of two agents to a pair of organizational
positions j and l can be swapped without aecting the expected prot of
the organization this will be denoted by j  l. If, for a given structure 
the agent located at node j is better than the agent at node l this will be
written as j  l. Indeed, it proves to be convenient to say that \node j is
better than node l" instead of \the agent located at node j is . . . ". In a
similar vein, it will be convenient to \swap nodes", instead of \swapping
agents" at particular nodes.
The exclamation mark \!" above a symbol means \should", or, in
other words, that the relationship containing some binary operator to
13
which the exclamation mark is added is required to hold for some other
condition to be satised. This other condition is usually the limitation
of the optimizer's knowledge to ordinal information about the characte-
ristics of the agents. For example, \j
!
 l" should be read as \node j
should be better than node l", or better still, \the agent located at node j
should be better than the agent at node l". Similarly, 
!S
= H
A
means
that the structure  should be equal to H
A
. The symbol \
O
) " will
be used in conjunction with statements containing exclamation marks:
\statement
1
O
) statement
2
", where both statements contain an excla-
mation mark, means that if statement
1
should hold, then one can deduce
that statement
2
should hold using exclusively ordinal information.
3 The Results
This section shows that the only structures that require no information
about the screening capabilities of the agents in order to nd the best
allocation of these agents to organizational positions are the pure hierarchy
and the pure polyarchy. It is also shown that the only structures for which
ordinal information is both sucient and necessary when determining the
best allocation of heterogeneous agents are linear structures. The mere
presence of one omniarchical connection implies the need to use cardinal
information about some agents to nd the optimal allocation.
A small digression is in order. It might be true that one observes
ex post that the level of expected prots is left unaected after a swap
of agents between two nodes. This may be the case for some specic
structure and some precise values of the characteristics of all the agents
involved, with the latter depending on the organizational structure. One
might then be tempted to conclude that \the ordering of agents does not
matter". It is not in this sense that I use here the phrase \swapping agents
leaves the expected prot unaected." With the latter I mean that one
knows ex ante and on the basis of the structure only, that swapping agents
14
is immaterial as far as the level of prots is concerned.
The results can be derived using binary swappings of agents and
comparing the ensuing dierence in prot. The dierence in prot resul-
ting from swapping (agent i at) node 
j
and (agent i
0
at) node 
l
will be
denoted by E(; 
j
; 
l
). Let me denote the probability that a project
of quality q reaches node !(
j
; 
l
) by p
q
( ! !(
j
; 
l
)). The dierence in
prot can then be written as
E(; 
j
; 
l
) = X
1
 (
j
; 
l
; g)  (1  )X
2
 (
j
; 
l
; b) (5)
where
 (
j
; 
l
; q) := (p
q
(
j
)  p
q
(
l
))p
q
((
j
; 
l
))p
q
( ! !(
j
; 
l
)) (6)
for q 2 fg; bg. The dependence of  () on q will often remain implicit,
by simply writing  (
j
; 
l
). The function p
q
((
j
; 
l
)) depends at most
on the characteristics of agents located at nodes that are part of the sub-
structure (
j
; 
l
). Note that p
q
((
j
; 
l
)) is not equal to the probability
with which some substructure accepts a project of quality q. Instead, it is
merely a function of the characteristics of the agents located at nodes in
the substructure (
j
; 
l
). Remember that this substructure is the smal-
lest substructure of  that contains both 
j
and 
l
.
15
The probability
p
q
( ! !(
j
; 
l
)) is equal to one for q 2 fg; bg if and only if  = !(
j
; 
l
).
Example (continued) Suppose one swaps the agents at the nodes 
aa
and 
ar
. Then  (
j
; 
l
) equals
 (
j
; 
l
) = (p(
aa
)  p(
ar
)) [p(
a
)(1  p(
aar
))  (1  p(
a
))] p()
15
To be specic, the function p
q
((
j
; 
l
)) depends exclusively on the (agents at the)
nodes on the path connecting !(
j
; 
l
) and 
j
, and connecting !(
j
; 
l
) and 
l
, and
on all the successors of 
j
and of 
l
.
15
As noted in section 2, any structure can be built recursively by adding
nodes that precede existing structures. Suppose one has written out the
expression for the change in prot E(; 
j
; 
l
) for some pair (
j
; 
l
)
in 
k
= (
j
; 
l
), the smallest sub{structure containing both 
j
and 
l
.
Suppose one makes a new structure by adding a node that precedes the
existing structure 
k
in a polyarchical or hierarchical way. Or suppose
one constructs a new structure by combining two existing structures, one
of which is 
k
, in an omniarchical way. Does such an expansion change
the expression E(; 
j
; 
l
)? Can it change the answer to the question
whether information is required to allocate 
j
and 
l
correctly? Can it
aect the level of detail in information required to allocate them correctly?
Can this addition aect the optimal ordering of agents at nodes 
j
and

l
?
As far as the expression E(; 
j
; 
l
) is concerned, it cannot aect
p
q
((
j
; 
l
)) as this part of the expression depends exclusively on nodes
in (
j
; 
l
), a set which is left unchanged by adding a node \at the front",
and, in particular, before node !(
j
; 
l
) of the pre{existing structure. It
does aect, however, p
q
( ! !(
j
; 
l
)), where  is the newly added node.
Indeed, the probability with which a project reaches the sub{structure
(
j
; 
l
) decreases.
Saying that no information is needed to optimally order the agents
located at nodes 
j
and 
l
means the same as saying that swapping the
position of agents at these positions leaves the expected prot unaected,
irrespective of the characteristics of the agents. Therefore, if no informa-
tion is needed E(; 
j
; 
l
) = 0. Since all that is known about the value
of p
q
( ! !(
j
; 
l
)) is that it is equal to one (if  = !(
j
; 
l
)) or less than
one (if  6= !(
j
; 
l
)), and since p
q
(
j
) 6= p
q
(
l
) for q 2 fg; bg, the only way
to ensure E(; 
j
; 
l
)
!
= 0 is by imposing p
q
((
j
; 
l
))
!
= 0 for q 2 fg; bg,
where the latter condition should hold for any pair of characteristics of
the agents involved. Moreover, this condition is clearly sucient. There-
fore, if it can be shown that no information is needed to allocate agents
correctly to the pair (
j
; 
l
) then p
q
((
j
; 
l
))
!
= 0 must be shown to hold
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for q 2 fg; bg, and vice versa. If this condition can be shown to hold for a
sub{structure 
k
= (
j
; 
l
), the condition can also be shown to hold for
the overall structure , as the set of nodes on which it depends stays the
same. In short, if no information is required to correctly allocate agents to
a pair of nodes in 
k
, no information is needed to allocate a pair of agents
to the same pair of nodes when this structure is merely a sub{structure
in a larger structure . And hence, if the ordering of a pair of nodes can
be proved not to matter in 
k
, it can be proved not to matter in .
By the same token, the necessity and suciency of ordinal informa-
tion concerning agents' characteristics for optimal allocations extends from
a sub{structure 
k
= (
j
; 
l
) to a structure  as a whole. Lemma 1 is
instrumental in this respect. It shows that the sign of p
q
((
j
; 
l
)) should
be the same for q = b and q = g for ordinal information to be sucient.
Lemma 1 In any structure , for ordinal information to be sucient to
determine sign[E(; 
j
; 
l
)] the condition
sign[p
g
((
j
; 
l
))]
!
= sign[p
b
((
j
; 
l
))] (7)
must hold.
This analysis shows that the characteristics of the agents preceding the
node !(
j
; 
l
) are not relevant as to whether no information, ordinal in-
formation, or cardinal information is necessary and sucient to correctly
allocate agents to nodes 
j
and 
l
. Let me state this in the following
observation as this proves useful for future reference.
Observation 1 Whether no knowledge at all, ordinal information, or
more than ordinal information is necessary and sucient to correctly allo-
cate heterogeneous agents to the pair of nodes (
j
; 
l
) only depends on the
(characteristics of the agents located at) nodes contained in (
j
; 
l
). In
other words, the structure preceding node !(
j
; 
l
) and the agents located
at such nodes can be ignored for this purpose.
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One can also conclude that adding nodes to existing structures cannot
decrease the required level of detail in information needed to allocate cor-
rectly every pair of agents.
Proposition 1 For any nite number of nodes, and for all pairs of cha-
racteristics (p
g
i
; p
b
i
), i = 1; : : : ; n, the only structures in which no infor-
mation is required to correctly allocate heterogeneous agents are the pure
hierarchy and the pure polyarchy.
Proof As the proposition makes a statement about the whole space of
organizational structures, and since structures can be recursively dened
I apply the principle of structural induction, which is the structural equi-
valent of the principle of mathematical induction. In the basis step one
proves that the statement holds for certain basic structures with a specic
number of nodes. One then supposes that the statement holds for any
structure containing at most n nodes, and then proves that the statement
holds for any structure containing n + 1 nodes. This is called the hypo-
thesis step or the induction hypothesis.
16
(() The simplest pure hierarchy and polyarchy both contain two no-
des. The probability function of a pure hierarchy with two nodes equals
p() = p()p(
a
), which is clearly independent of the ordering of the
agents. The same is true for a polyarchy consisting of two agents, as its
probability function amounts to p() = p() + p(
r
)   p()p(
r
). So the
implication holds for the basic forms. Now assume that the implication
holds for all structures  containing at most n nodes. Consider the struc-
tures (a) 
0
= H, (b) 
0
= P, and (c) 
0
= O(;
1
;
2
). Since in
(c) the resulting structure is not pure the implication is trivially true. In
case of (a), for 
0
= H to be pure,  should be pure. If  is a pure
hierarchy, so is 
0
, and it is straightforward to see that no information is
required to correctly allocate agents. If 
0
is a pure polyarchy, the resul-
ting structure  is linear, i.e., not pure, and so the implication is trivially
16
For a formal statement of the principle see Fitting (1990).
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true. The same line of reasoning can be used in case of (b). This shows
that any pure hierarchy or polyarchy does not require information about
the agents for them to be correctly allocated.
()) Of the three basic structures, the hierarchy of two nodes, the poly-
archy containing two nodes, and the omniarchy of three nodes, only the
rst two do not require information. Moreover, they are pure. This pro-
ves the basis step. Assume that the implication holds for all structures 
containing at most n nodes. Consider the structures (a) 
0
= H, (b)

0
= P, and (c) 
0
= O(;
1
;
2
).
In (a), if no information is required for 
0
then no information is required
for . This follows from observation 1. So, by the induction hypothesis
 should be pure. If  equals a pure polyarchy, swapping the (agents
located at) positions  and 
a
gives rise to
 (; 
a
) = (p()   p(
a
))p(
AR
) (8)
For p(
AR
) = 0, the structure 
AR
should be empty, in which case 
0
would be a pure hierarchy of two nodes. The implication applies and is
true. If p(
AR
) > 0, ordinal information is required as 
!
 
a
should
hold. Hence, the implication is trivially true. If  equals a pure hierarchy,
then so is 
0
. Clearly no information is required. This proves that in case
(a) the implication holds. By the same token, the implication holds in
(b).
In case of (c), for no information to be required for 
0
, no information
should be required for 
i
, i = 1; 2. By the induction hypothesis 
1
and

2
are pure. Swapping  and any node in, say, 
1
reveals that ordinal
information is required. This shows that the implication is trivially true.

The second proposition characterizes the organizational structures for
which ordinal information is both sucient and necessary when determi-
ning the optimal allocation of heterogeneous agents. If ordinal information
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is to be sucient, pairwise comparisons of the type, \Should the better
agent be located at node j or at node l?" provide the required insight into
the ordering of the agents. The series of lemmas that follows is needed in
the proof of the proposition.
Lemma 2 states that if  contains at least two nodes, for ordinal
information to be sucient to prove that p
q
(
j
)
!
> p() for either q = b
or q = g, the rst two elements of organization  should be hierarchically
connected.
Lemma 2 If  contains at least two nodes and is linear, then
p
q
(
j
)
!
> p
q
()
O
) 
!S
= 
j
H
jA
(9)
for any 
jA
, and either q = b or q = g.
Lemma 3 is the analogous result for p
q
(
j
)
!
< p
q
():
Lemma 3 If  contains at least two nodes and is linear then
p
q
(
j
)
!
< p
q
()
O
) 
!S
= 
l
P
lR
(10)
for any 
jA
, and where either q = b or q = g.
The following lemma states that if ordinal information is sucient to show
that 
j
 
l
, then this suciency extends to all orderings 
j
 
k
where
the position of 
l
and 
k
can be swapped without aecting organizational
performance.
Lemma 4 Consider any three nodes 
j
, 
l
, and 
k
that are part of a linear
structure , and suppose that ordinal information is sucient to show that

j
 
l
and 
l
 
k
hold. Then ordinal information is sucient to show
that 
j
 
k
holds.
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Lemma 5 states that ordinal information is not sucient to prove that
one single node 
l
is better or worse than a linear structure .
Lemma 5 Ordinal information is not sucient to prove that
sign[p
g
(
l
)  p
g
()]
!
=  sign[p
b
(
l
)  p
b
()] (11)
holds in a linear structure .
However, it cannot be shown either, using exclusively ordinal information,
that the opposite holds:
Lemma 6 Ordinal information is not sucient to prove that
sign[p
g
(
l
)  p
g
()]
!
= sign[p
b
(
l
)  p
b
()] (12)
holds in a linear structure .
The lemmas 7 and 8 state that if the two structures 
j
and 
l
are charac-
terized by the same connection between the rst node and the subsequent
sub{structure, ordinal information is not enough to show sign[p
g
(
j
)  
p
g
(
l
)]
!
= sign[p
b
(
j
)  p
b
(
l
)].
Lemma 7 Assume that 
j
S
= 
j
H
jA
and 
l
S
= 
l
H
lA
. Then ordinal
information information is not sucient to show sign[p
g
(
j
)  p
g
(
l
)]
!
=
sign[p
b
(
j
)  p
b
(
l
)].
Lemma 8 Assume that 
j
S
= 
j
P
jR
and 
l
S
= 
l
P
lR
. Then ordinal
information information is not sucient to show sign[p
g
(
j
)  p
g
(
l
)]
!
=
sign[p
b
(
j
)  p
b
(
l
)].
In lemma 1 it was shown that sign[p
g
((
j
; 
l
))]
!
= sign[p
b
((
j
; 
l
))]
for ordinal information to be sucient. Imagine that one reduces the
dierence between any pair of characteristics p
q
(
k
) and p
q
(
k
0
), for all
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k
; 
k
0
2 (
j
; 
l
), while maintaining the ordering of these agents. Clearly,
if in the limit of no dierence at all between any agents the function p
q
()
takes on opposite signs for q = b and for q = g, then p
q
() will also assume
opposite sign for any ordering of the agents as long as their characteristics
are almost identical. This is made precise in the following lemma for a
special case:
Lemma 9 If p
g
((
j
; 
l
)) ! x for p
g
(
k
) ! 1 for all 
k
2 (
j
; 
l
),
and if p
b
((
j
; 
l
)) ! y for p
b
(
k
) ! 0 for all 
k
2 (
j
; 
l
), and where
sign[x] =  sign[y], then ordinal information is not sucient to determine
the optimal ordering of 
j
and 
l
.
Note carefully that the lemma does not state that x should equal 1 and
that y should equal 0. This does not have to hold as p
q
((
j
; 
l
)) is not
the probability of acceptance of (
j
; 
l
). I am now able to prove the
second proposition of this chapter:
Proposition 2 For any number of nodes, and for any pair of characte-
ristics (p
g
1
; p
b
i
) of the agents, i = 1; : : : ; n, the only structures for which
ordinal information is both necessary and sucient are structures that are
linear.
Proof (() First the basis step. Consider the two simplest linear structu-
res, H
a
P
ar
and P
r
H
ra
. It is straightforward to see that ordinal in-
formation is necessary and sucient. This proves the basis step. Suppose
that the implication holds for all structures  containing at most n nodes,
and consider (a) 
0
= H, (b) 
0
= P, and (c) 
0
= O(;
1
;
2
).
Note that in case (c) the structure is not linear, and therefore the impli-
cation is trivially true.
In (a), if 
0
= H is linear then  should be pure or linear. If  is a
pure hierarchy then so is 
0
, and so the implication does not apply. If 
is a pure polyarchy, then 
0
is linear. Write 
0
= H
a
P
AR
, with 
AR
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a pure polyarchy. Therefore, 
a
 
ar
     
ar:::r
. Moreover, 
!
 
a
and thus, by lemma 4, 
!
 
ar
; : : : ; 
arr
etc. That is, ordinal information
is necessary and sucient.
If, on the other hand  is linear, then, by the induction step, ordinal
information is necessary and sucient for  to be correctly organized. So,
by obervation 1, ordinal information is necessary for structure 
0
. Take
any node 
j
2 . Then either (i) 
j
= 
j
H
jA
or 
j
is the nal node, or
(ii) 
j
= 
j
P
jR
.
In (i), if all links between  and 
j
are hierarchical (or if 
j
= 
a
), then
  
j
. In the contrary case, 
!
 
j
.
In (ii), 
!
 
r
.
()) Of all the structures that contain at most three nodes, the implication
holds: if ordinal information is necessary and sucient, then the structure
is linear. This is the basis step. Now suppose that the implication holds
for all structures with at most n nodes, and consider (a) 
0
= H, (b)

0
= P, and (c) 
0
= O(;
1
;
2
).
In case (a), if ordinal information is necessary and sucient for 
0
= H
then ordinal information must be sucient (and perhaps be necessary) for
. This follows from observation 1. So,  is pure or linear by the induction
step.
If  is a pure hierarchy, then 
0
is a pure hierarchy and therefore, by
proposition 1 no information is required. If  is a pure polyarchy, then 
0
is linear. If  is linear, then 
0
is linear. This proves the correctness of
the implication in case of (a).
Case (b) can be solved in the same fashion.
Finally case (c). Suppose ordinal information is necessary and sucient.
Then, by observation 1, ordinal information should be sucient for 
1
and 
2
. Therefore, by the induction step, 
1
and 
2
are linear or pure.
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I split this case up in four sub{cases: (i) 
0
S
= O(; 
a
H
AA
; 
r
P
RR
),
(ii) 
0
S
= O(; 
a
P
AR
; 
r
P
RR
), (iii) 
0
S
= O(; 
a
H
AA
; 
r
H
RA
), and
(iv) 
0
S
= O(; 
a
P
AR
; 
r
H
RA
).
(i) Consider swapping the nodes 
a
and 
r
, and in particular
 (
a
; 
r
) = (p(
a
)  p(
r
))p((
a
; 
r
)) (13)
with
p((
a
; 
r
)) = p()p(
AA
) + (1   p())p(
RR
)  (1  p()) (14)
If p(
j
) ! 1 for all 
j
2 (
a
; 
r
), then p((
a
; 
r
)) ! 1 , while if
p(
j
) ! 0 for all 
j
, then p((
a
; 
r
)) !  1. Then, by lemma 1 and 9,
ordinal information is not sucient.
(ii) The analysis is based on the expression
 (
a
; 
r
) = (p(
a
)  p(
r
))p((
a
; 
r
))
with
p((
a
; 
r
)) = p()(1   p(
AR
))  (1  p())(1  p(
RR
)) (15)
If p(
j
)! 0 for all 
j
2 (
a
; 
r
), then p((
a
; 
r
))!  1, and therefore
sign[p
q
((
a
; 
r
))]
!
=  1 (16)
for q 2 fg; bg. Let me rst look at the good projects. If p
g
(
AR
) <
p
g
(
RR
) then p
g
((
a
; 
r
)) > 0, which violates condition (16). So the
remaining case is p
g
(
AR
)
!
> p
g
(
RR
). From
 (; 
a
) = (p()  p(
a
))((; 
a
)) (17)
with
p((; 
a
)) = p(
AR
)  (p(
r
) + (1  p(
r
))p(
RR
)) (18)
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one can deduce that 
AR
S
6= 
ar
P
ARR
by lemma 8. Hence, of the three
possible orderings of p
g
(), p
g
(
AR
), and p
g
(
RR
) satisfying p
g
(
RR
)
!
<
p
g
(
AR
), namely p
g
()
!
< p
g
(
RR
)
!
< p(
AR
), p
g
(
RR
)
!
< p
g
()
!
< p
g
(
AR
),
and p
g
(
RR
)
!
< p
g
(
AR
)
!
< p
g
(), only the latter does not require 
AR
!S
=

ar
P
ARR
. Instead, this ordering requires 
AR
!S
= 
ar
H
ARA
, and 
RR
!S
=

rr
H
RRA
. The latter inequality should hold for otherwise one cannot
show using ordinal information only that p
g
(
RR
)
!
< p
g
(
AR
)
On the other hand, for the bad quality projects, one cannot impose
p
b
(
AR
)
!
> p
b
(
RR
), as this, in combination with p
g
(
AR
)
!
> p
g
(
RR
), and
with the restriction on the structures of 
AR
and 
RR
would require more
than ordinal information by lemma 7. But, imposing p
b
(
AR
)
!
< p
b
(
RR
)
on its own is not enough to show p
b
((; 
a
)) < 0, and so a restriction of
the type p
b
()
!
> p
b
(
AR
) would be needed. However, any restriction of
this type, in conjunction with the restriction p
g
(
RR
)
!
< p
g
(
AR
)
!
< p
g
(),
would lead to the insuciency of ordinal information, either by lemma 5
or 6. That is, in case (ii) more than ordinal information is needed.
(iii) From  (; 
r
) = (p()  p(
r
))((; 
r
)) with
p((; 
r
)) = p(
a
)p(
AA
)  p(
AR
) (19)
in combination with lemma 7 it follows that 
AR
!S
6= 
ar
H
ARA
. From
 (
a
; 
r
)
 (
a
; 
r
) = (p(
a
)  p(
r
))p((
a
; 
r
)) (20)
with
p((
a
; 
r
)) = p()p(
AA
)  (1  p())p(
AR
) (21)
If p(
j
) ! 1 for all 
j
2 (
a
; 
r
), then p((
a
; 
r
)) ! 1, and therefore,
from lemma 1 it follows that
sign[p
q
((
a
; 
r
))]
!
= + (22)
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for both q = b and q = g. In particular, p
b
((
a
; 
r
))
!
> 0, which requires
at least p
b
(
AA
)
!
> p
b
(
RA
), and some restriction on p
b
(). Since 
RA
!S
6=

ra
H
RAA
, the only possible restriction is p
b
(
AA
)
!
> p
b
(
RA
)
!
> p
b
().
The same line of reasoning as used in (ii) leads to the conclusion that
ordinal information is not sucient either in this case.
(iv) Once again, the analysis is based on the expression p((
a
; 
r
)):
 (
a
; 
r
) = (p(
a
)  p(
r
)) [p()   (p()p(
AR
) + (1  p())p(
RA
))]
(23)
If p()
!
> max(p(
AR
); p(
RA
)) for q 2 fg; bg, then both p
g
()
!
> p
g
(
AR
)
and p
b
()
!
> p
b
(
AR
) should hold. Lemma 6 shows that more than or-
dinal information is required to prove these statements jointly. By the
same token, p()
!
< min(p(
AR
); p(
RA
)) cannot be proved using ordinal
information only. Hence,
p
q
() 2 (min (p
q
(
AR
); p
q
(
RA
)) ;max (p
q
(
AR
); p
q
(
RA
))
for both q = b and q = g is the only remaining possibility. In view of
lemmas 5 and 6, this gives rise to two possibilities:
(a) p
g
()
!
2 (p
g
(
AR
); p
g
(
RA
)) and p
b
()
!
2

p
b
(
RA
); p
b
(
AR
)

. The
former condition implies 
AR
!S
= 
ar
H
ARA
(see lemma 2), while the latter
requires 
AR
!S
= 
ar
P
ARR
(see lemma 2). These conditions cannot be
satised at the same time.
(b) p
g
()
!
2 (p
g
(
RA
); p
g
(
AR
)) and p
b
()
!
2

p
b
(
AR
); p
b
(
RA
)

. The
same conicting requirements concerning the structure of 
RA
as under
(a) show the insuciency of ordinal information. 
It should be clear from the proof, and in particular from the rst part,
that there is a very simple procedure that ensures a correct allocation of
agents to nodes in a linear (pure or mixed) structure.
26
Corollary 1 Consider any linear structure  (eiher pure or mixed). Then
a procedure to correctly allocate heterogeneous agents to the nodes 
j
2 
is to position the best agent at the rst node, the second best at the second,
etc., until the last position has been lled.
Note that this procedure holds for any linear structure , independent of
the particular arrangement of the individual nodes. Correctly allocating
agents to positions in the presence of omniarchical relationships is much
more complicated, and is beyond the scope of this chapter.
4 Conclusion
To err is human. The literature on organizational design, however, lar-
gely foregoes a detailed analysis of the importance this proverbial truth
may have on the empirical studies it contains and on the recommendati-
ons it proposes. This chapter has related the presence of fallible agents
to the detail of information required to position such agents correctly in
organizational communication structures. This classication of informa-
tion induces a typology of structures characterized by increasing levels of
complexity.
Sah and Stiglitz conjectured that the relative simplicity of obser-
ved organizational structures reects their alleged robustness to changes
in the environment.
17
This chapter suggests another, complementary ex-
planation. It is the organizational designer's limited knowledge about
the characteristics of the employees in combination with the costs of ob-
taining such information that prohibits her from designing complex and
theoretically superior structures. This type of argument is similar to the
one proposed in the literature on contract design. The limited cognitive
capabilities and knowledge of the contract designer are put forward as
17
See Sah and Stiglitz (1988, p. 467).
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reasons why real world contracts are extremely simple when compared to
the optimal contracts derived in the literature.
Although reference was made to the possible dierences in robust-
ness of structures I have not dealt with this issue in this chapter. One
might want to know which organizational building blocks are robust, and
how their robustness is related to its internal structure and the distribu-
tion of employees. The simplicity of the agents' binary decision problem
as modelled in this chapter may provide an ideal playground to gain in-
sight into these matters. Relatedly, but from an empirical angle, one
might like to gain understanding of the robustness of commonly observed
communication structures.
Appendix: Proofs
In this appendix, the proofs of the lemmas are given.
Proof of lemma 1 Suppose one wants to know whether E(; 
j
; 
l
) >
0. If
E(; 
j
; 
l
) = X
1
 (
j
; 
l
; g)   (1   )X
2
 (
j
; 
l
; b) > 0 (A.2)
then the agents located at node 
j
and at 
l
are well positioned, while if
the dierence is negative, the position of the agents should be swapped.
Equation (A.2) is equivalent to
(p
g
(
j
)  p
g
(
l
))
(p
b
(
j
)  p
b
(
l
))
p
g
((
j
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l
))
p
b
((
j
; 
l
))
p
g
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
p
b
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
>
1  

X
2
X
1
(A.3)
for  (
j
; 
l
; b) > 0 and
(p
g
(
j
)  p
g
(
l
))
(p
b
(
j
)  p
b
(
l
))
p
g
((
j
; 
l
))
p
b
((
j
; 
l
))
p
g
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
p
b
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
<
1  

X
2
X
1
(A.4)
for  (
j
; 
l
; b) < 0.
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I show that if one is in possession of ordinal information only, equa-
tion (A.3) cannot be shown to hold, while equation (A.4) can be shown
to hold if and only if the condition in equation (7) is satised. Gi-
ven the limitation to ordinal information, the values of the constituent
parts on the LHS of equations (A.3) and (A.4) are not known. Consi-
der rst equation (A.3). Since the right hand side is larger than zero,
(p
g
(
j
)  p
g
(
l
))p
g
((
j
; 
l
))p
g
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
!
> 0 should hold.
The intuition behind the proof is to x a certain allocation of agents
to nodes, and to vary the values of the agents' characteristics, while re-
specting the ordering of the agents. Remember that the word \orde-
ring" refers to the ordering of the screening qualities of agents at various
nodes (\agent located at node 
j
is better than agent located at 
l
").
Suppose a certain allocation  applies, inducing an ordering of agents
over organizational nodes, and conduct the following mental experiment.
Keep the value of (p
b
(
j
)   p
b
(
l
)) and of p
b
((
j
; 
l
)) xed, while re-
ducing the dierence between p
g
(
j
) and p
g
(
l
), without violating the
ordering of 
j
and 
l
. Since (
j
; 
l
) contains just a nite number of
nodes, 0  jp
g
((
j
; 
l
))j < M
g
. Therefore,
(p
g
(
j
)  p
g
(
l
))
(p
b
(
j
)  p
b
(
l
))
p
g
((
j
; 
l
))
p
b
((
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; 
l
))
p
g
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
p
b
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
! 0 (A.5)
for p
g
(
j
)! p
g
(
l
). Similarily, it can be shown that
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g
(
j
)  p
g
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l
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(p
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l
))
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((
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))
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( ! !(
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))
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( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
!1 (A.6)
for p
b
(
j
)! p
b
(
l
) without violating the ordering of the agents. That is,
one and the same ordering of agents can give rise to any positive number.
Hence, ordinal information is not enough to show that equation (A.3)
holds. For the same reason, ordinal information is not sucient in case
of equation (A.4) if (p
g
(
j
)   p
g
(
l
))p
g
((
j
; 
l
))p
g
( ! !(
j
; 
l
)) < 0.
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Indeed, the only possibility when ordinal information may be sucient is
when
(p
g
(
j
)  p
g
(
l
))
(p
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< 0 (A.7)
for (p
b
(
j
) p
b
(
l
))p
b
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l
))p
b
(! !(
j
; 
l
))
!
< 0. Because of assump-
tion 2, the expression
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holds for every pair of agents, while
p
g
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
p
b
( ! !(
j
; 
l
))
> 0
and therefore, in the light of equation (A.7), for ordinal information to be
sucient
sign[p
g
((
j
; 
l
))]
!
= sign[p
b
((
j
; 
l
))] (A.8)
should hold, which is condition (7). 
Proof of lemma 2 Consider p
g
(
j
)
!
> p
g
() (the same line of reasoning
applies for q = b). Then, either (i) 
S
= 
l
P
jR
or (ii) 
S
= 
l
H
jA
as  is
linear. In case (i), p
g
(
j
)
!
> p
g
() = p
g
(
l
)+(1 p
g
(
l
))p
g
(
lR
). However,
for p
g
(
j
) p
g
(
l
) suciently small, and for any ordering of 
j
, 
l
, and the
nodes of 
lR
, p
g
(
j
) < p
g
(
l
) + (1   p
g
(
l
))p
g
(
lR
) holds. Hence, ordinal
information is not sucient. In case (ii), p
g
() = p
g
(
l
)p
g
(
l
). Hence, if
p
g
(
j
) > p
g
(
l
) then p
g
(
j
) > p
g
(). That is, ordinal information can be
sucient. 
Proof of lemma 3 The proof used for lemma 2 also applies, mutatis
mutandis, for this lemma. 
Proof of lemma 4 By proposition 1 if 
l
 
k
then either only hierar-
chical or only polyarchical building blocks are used in connecting nodes 
l
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and 
k
. Therefore 
k
2 (
j
; 
l
). Since ordinal information is sucient
to show that 
j
!
 
l
, p
q
((
j
; 
l
))
!
> 0 can be shown to hold using ordi-
nal information only. Since 
l
 
k
, 
l
2 (
j
; 
k
), and p((
j
; 
k
)) =
p((
j
; 
l
)). Hence, sign[p
q
((
j
; 
k
))] = sign[p
q
((
j
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l
))], and so 
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!


k
. 
Proof of lemma 5 Suppose p
g
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l
)
!
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g
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j
) and p
b
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l
)
!
< p
b
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j
) (the
same line of reasoning that follows can be applied to the opposite case
p
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!
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g
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j
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b
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)
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b
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j
)). Then, from lemma 2, 
j
!S
= 
j
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,
while lemma 3 shows that 
j
!S
= 
j
P
jA
. This is a contradiction. 
Proof of lemma 6: I discuss the case where (i) p
g
(
l
)
!
> p
g
() and
p
b
(
l
)
!
> p
b
(), and the case where (ii) p
g
(
l
)
!
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g
() and p
b
(
l
)
!
< p
b
()
in turn.
(i) From lemma 2, 
!S
= 
j
H
jA
, implying that
p
q
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)
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q
()
O
)
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>
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b
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g
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l
)
!
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g
(
jA
)
(A.9)
where 
jA
is either (a) a degenerate (sub{)organization equal to 
jA
=

ja
, or (b) a proper (sub{)organization containing at least two nodes. In
case (a), the conditions in equation (A.9) can be rewritten as
p
q
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)
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q
()
O
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>
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
l
!
 
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 
l
or

j
!
 
l
^ 
l
!
 
ja
(A.10)
However, since 
!S
= 
j
H
ja
, 
j
 
ja
holds, and thereore, by lemma 4
either 
l
!
 
j
 
ja
or 
j
 
ja
!
 
l
, which violates either condition
mentioned in equation (A.10). This shows that both p
g
(
l
)
!
> p
g
() and
p
b
(
l
)
!
> p
b
() cannot be shown using ordinal information only when

jA
= 
ja
.
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In case (b), p
q
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)
!
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q
(
jA
)
O
) 
jA
!S
= 
ja
H
jAA
. Since 
!S
=

j
H
ja
H
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, 
j
 
ja
should hold. Consider the top line of condi-
tion A.9 rst. Since 
j
 
ja
should hold, the condition can be rewritten
as 
l
!
 
j
 
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^ p
b
(
l
)
!
> p
b
(
jA
). The latter part boils down to
p
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)
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) = p
b
(
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)p
b
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), which, together with p
b
(
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)
!
< p
b
(
ja
),
implies p
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(
l
)
!
> p
b
(
jAA
). That is, 
AA
should be hierarchically structu-
red, and one enters an innite regress. However, structures are assumed
to be nite. Therefore, more than ordinal information is required. The
proof of the insuciency of ordinal information in case of the condition at
the bottom line of (A.9) proceeds in the same fashion.
(ii) From lemma 3, 
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, implying that
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(A.11)
The same way of reasoning as under (i) applies. Hence, ordinal informa-
tion is not sucient to show that both p
g
(
l
) < p
g
() and p
b
(
l
) < p
b
()
hold. 
Proof of lemma 7 I discuss the case sign[p
g
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j
) p
g
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l
)]
!
= sign[p
b
(
j
) 
p
b
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l
)] = + (This implies no limitation as one can freely interchange
the structures 
j
and 
l
). Since 
j
S
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and 
l
S
= 
l
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lA
,
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)
!
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b
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). For both these conditi-
ons to hold either of the following set of conditions must hold:
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(A.12)
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In case of condition (A.12) it follows from p
b
(
j
)
!
> p
b
(
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) that 
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, which in turn implies that p
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) and 
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. Moreover, since p
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holds. Therefore 
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). The latter implication together with p
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)
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) shows that p
b
(
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)
!
> p
b
(
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) should hold. That is 
lAA
!S
=

laa
H
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, and one enters an innite regress. This proves that ordinal
information is insucient, since the structures are nite. In case of con-
dition (A.12) one enters an innite regress for the same reason. 
Proof of lemma 8 The structure of the conditions that should hold for
sign[p
g
(
j
) p
g
(
l
)]
!
= sign[p
b
(
j
) p
b
(
l
)] = + are identical to the struc-
ture of the conditions of lemma 7. One can now derive an innite regress
by showing that 
j
should be an innite pure polyarchy, which is impos-
sible given the limitation to nite structures. 
Proof of lemma 9 Since the function p((
j
; 
l
)) is continuous in its
arguments, any ordering of the nodes 
k
2 (
j
; 
l
), with values p
g
(
k
)
suciently close to 1 satises sign[p
g
((
j
; 
l
))] = sign[x].
Similarily, any ordering of the nodes 
k
2 (
j
; 
l
), with values
p
b
(
k
) suciently close to 0 satises sign[p
b
((
j
; 
l
))] = sign[y]. That is,
one and the same ordering can give rise to opposite signs of p((
j
; 
l
)).
Then, by lemma 1, ordinal information is not sucient. 
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